Student Network for Human Security (SNHS) Blog

Minamata disease

In the southern island of Kyushu, about one thousand kilometers from Tokyo, at the shore of Shiranui sea, is the city of Minamata. In the early days of twentieth century, Minamata was a small town in Kumamoto prefecture, depending on salt and coal exploitation for its economic income and energy production. However, salt was to be soon monopolized by the government and coal no longer needed because of a hydro electrical power project, both of these in the very same moment when Chisso Corporation was looking for a place to construct a plant for calcium carbide production. Then, in 1932, the factory started producing acetaldehyde using mercury as catalyst, which would become the cause of terrible health outcomes to be known as Mina-mata disease.

Organic mercury from the factory effluent started to get accumulated in fish and shellfish on the city bay, which were captured by local fishermen and distributed in the market. The pollutant, also accumulated inside the human body, principally attacks the central nervous system resulting on poor motor coordination, sensory disturbances in the extremities, lost of speech and of hearing capacity, as some of the symptoms, deteriorating the patient’s condition until dead. Furthermore, organic mercury crosses the umbilical chord and accumulates also in the placenta of pregnant women, resulting in congenital cases of the disease, children whom will be born with different levels of cerebral palsy.

Prior to the upsurge of the disease, in the beginning of the 50’s, the company and the local government had to provide welfare payments to fi-shermen because of the decline of catch in the bay, first visible effect of pol-lution impact in the area. Then, in the 1953, cats started to go crazy and die, followed by the first symptoms in humans, which led people to understand that the poisoning pathway was fish (JICA, 2005, pg. 156). The official dis-covery of the disease dates from 1956, when the research process started and so the struggle for recognizance.
The former group, fishermen, was the first to protest and get compen-sation payments in 1959, followed the same year by a sollatium payment to the second group, victims, but both of those compensations were very paltry (JICA, 2005, pg. 156). Chisso Corporation represented almost the 50% of the total tax income of the city, and employed the 25% of the population. Besides, a high-level ex-employee of the factory was elected mayor of the city for sev-eral years during the time span of the disease incidence. Although in the 50’s the company started to decay, in comparison to other Japanese enterprises, it was visited by the emperor in two occasions, 1931 and 1949, remarking its importance for Japanese economy (George, 2001, pg. 26-41). Not to mention the support of the companies sector –Japanese Chemical Industry Associa-tion – with direct link to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Hence, the company was able to fix its sympathy payments, pressure government officials of all levels and scientist to delay the studies, hire its own researchers or get support from renowned universities, restrict access to the plant in the look for proofs for twelve years, 1968, when officials found that the company’s organic mercury was the cause of the disease.

Kumamoto University reported probable link to mercury in 1959, year in which doctor Hajime Hosokawa, internal researcher in the company, also found out through experiments on cats that the factory waste produced the disease. However, the former did not afford enough credibility of government officials, while the later was concealed and proves banished. In the same year, the company installed an equipment to treat the effluent, though the com-pany officials and technicians knew it would not solution the problem. It is also worth to note that for some time research funding came from the United States (George, 2001, pg. 45).

Silence was embraced for five years, until the occurrence of Niigata Minamata disease in 1965 encouraged victims – old and new ones, since the source of pollution was not stopped until 1968, just before the official an-nouncement of responsibility, and vulnerable population have no other op-tion but to keep consuming contaminated fish – to fight for fair compensation. Different groups of citizens were formed in order to take action, differing on the strategy to use: direct negotiations, mediated negotiations and litigation in 1969.

In the meantime, central government most of the time relied on prefec-tural mediation, easily by-passed through MITI involvement, what resulted in formation and disbandment of several commissions for investigation around the disease. Ministry of Health had not enough preparation and power to manage this situation, following same pattern as mediation initia-tives until the official repot on 1968. Posterior process consisted in enactment of laws, initially tainted by economic growth preeminence and low standards, and the creation of the Environmental agency. Nevertheless, application always fell again on local administration. On the other hand, opposition political groups followed and supported the case, although the victims group longed to remain apolitical during the whole struggle.

Several factors converged for the positive resolution of the lawsuit in March 1973, and subsequent solution agreement in September. In few words: all of the groups made pressure on different spheres – local, national, in the Court, inside the company –; the other three disease cases gave momentum to a rise on public sensibility, specially Niigata Minamata; leaders from the group persevered over the long trials, incorporating innovative ways to pro-test and negotiate as they felt supported – among them: sit-ins, leaflets, books, photography, performance, legal access into the company’s shareholder meeting, the use of the body and exposition of affected victims. Media finally, around 1968, gave credit and relevance to the situation in Minamata and therefore helped to maintain the awareness of the public opinion and consequent pressure for answers. Moreover, distortions during all the process were unmasked, starting by Dr. Hosokawa confession and then followed by other employees, plus the discovery of prove material alteration.

A total of 2,265 victims were certified and compensated under the 1973 agreement. However, many more patients pleaded to be recognized without success, principally because of the criteria for certification, until 1995, when the Cabinet supported to subsidy the company on the disbursement for another 10,353 victims – compensated but not certified – on an effort to finish the case. This agreement included an apology from the Prime Minister in the name of the government.

However, nowadays there are some complaints in course: in August 2006, another 100 victims sued for recognition and compensation. To a continuing lawsuit more than a thousand people more joined. By the time, around 4.300 people have applied to local governments for the same purpose (Asahi Shinbun 2006, Japan Times, 2006). The crux of the problem keeps being the certification process, which plaintiffs allege is too strict, while the govern-ment refuses to any amendment. The company still exists.

Niigata-Minamata

Clinically, Niigata-Minamata disease is the same Minamata disease, so in many sources when doing general reports the former is not considered in detail. In this case, the polluter was a factory owned by Showa Denko Com-pany, and the source of the pollutant the same process utilized in Chisso’s plant. However, according to the Ministry of Environment, the process of producing acetaldehyde had already closed before Minamata disease was discovered there (MOE, 2002). The organic mercury was disposed to the Agano River, and the people affected were dispersed along the riverside, in areas that had no ties to the factory. The first victims were discovered in 1965, the patients sued in 1967 and Court recognition was obtained in 1971.

Niigata was the first of the four big lawsuits. Once the presence of the disease was confirmed, some of the supporters of Kumamoto case hurried to help the victims, in part ashamed by the poor success in Minamata (George, 2001, pg. 175). In fact, Niigata case was the actual motivation for doctor Hosokawa decided to reveal his findings. Meanwhile, Showa Denko denied any responsibility, while MITI supported and alleged uncertainty on the cause relation of the ailment. Finally, the official report blaming the Com-pany was issued in 1968, fact that motivated all the affected to join the lawsuit, and then, three years later, the recognition came. Officials of Showa, who initially announced they would not accept any indictment, two days be-fore the verdict reversed their position and abided the sentence.

In total, 690 persons were certified in Niigata and, summing all Mina-mata certified patients, around 144.1 billion yen have been paid in compen-sation, as of March 2001. The company still exists.

Itai Itai

Meaning literally “Hurts! Hurts!, this disease is a critic example of chronic cadmium poisoning and its grievous impacts. Information about the initial apparition of the disease date from 1920s (McKean, 1981, pg. 45), al-though the first report in academia is from October 1955 (MOE, 1996). It occurred along the Jinzū River, Toyama prefecture, where polluted water coming from a mine of the company Mitsui Mining and Smelting, in southern Gifu prefecture, was used to irrigate paddy fields and, then, ingested through rice. The principal symptoms were kidney failure and weakening of bone structure to the point of extreme vulnerability to fractures. Most of the victims were women – only six men who used the water for daily consumption – because of the different need of calcium intake, directly affected by the pollutant. It is also important to remark the low survival rate of cadmium poisoning patients, where only 13 of the patients were still alive for 1991.

Clinical research was done principally by doctor Hagino Noboru, who first diagnosed the disease in 1946. Similar to Minamata’s case, the re-searcher had tremendous pressure to drop his work. In 1961, a local com-mittee was formed to get in charge of the problem, group from which the re-searcher and his associates were excluded. Nevertheless, he kept his work in other geographical places inside Japan that were idle to present the same diagnosis, thanks to a grant from the United States National Institute of Health, while scientific community looked for different explanations. Later on 1964, Dr. Hagino found more cases in Tsushima, Nagasaki prefecture, which lately on 1974 would be also recognized for compensation (McKean, 1981, pg47).

In the year of 1966 the local committee, in association of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) and the Ministry of Education, overtly concluded that the cause of itai itai was cadmium poisoning, and in 1968 announced that no source could be found for the cadmium that was causing the chronic poisoning other than wastewater coming from Kamioka Mine, the one ad-ministrated by Mitsui (MOE, 1996). Out of this result, and supported by doctor Hagino, the patients became associated in 1966 and filed a suit in 1968.

As the lawsuit advanced, the municipal and Toyama prefectural gov-ernment turned to support from the company side, as it initially was, to the patients’ claims, announcing its intention to also suit to get a disbursement for what it had to pay to patients since 1968. It is important to remark the support to victims from leftist groups, which started to appear and made advocacy around one year before the report. Also of importance, the state-ment by MHW obliged the company to allow access to its facilities for re-search purposes to those on the plaintiff’s side and, thus, facilitated inves-tigation.

Finally, the court delivered its verdict in favor of the victims in 1971. The Company decided to appeal – opportunity that the plaintiffs used to enlarge their demands – and lost again, in what finally were compensation payments for, according to McKean, 148.2 millions yen, and the 156 certified people under the "Relief Law" and the "Compensation Law" (MOE, 1996). This company also exists nowadays.

Yokkaichi Asthma

Cases of respiratory affection produced by air pollution are common all around the industrialized world, even prior to the famous one in Japan. The point on Yokkaichi, a city of around 200.000 people in Mie prefecture, was that the construction and operation since 1957 of a complex of heavy indus-tries resulted in just three years in the rise of citizen’s claims (Kitabatake, 2002). Then, a problem already globally recognized in the big industrial ci-ties of the world, but of impossible liability because of the nature of the pol-lution problem – amount of sources and untraceable dispersion in the air – got in Yokkaichi a “face” to indict.

Nevertheless, the citizen movement was rather weak, being even re-garded as an example of the failure when relying on traditional institutions to solve environmental problems. One crucial fact explaining the reason for this outcome was that not just one but several major industries were the members of the cluster, disproportionately increasing industrial share of power and, consequently, population vulnerability.

Among the official initiatives to counter the problem were observation, inspection and air pollution regulations, although very weak (.18 ppm to .22 ppm for sulfurous acid, despite asthma was produced from concentrations of .17 ppm; McKean, 1981, pg. 59-61) In 1966 and 1967 two of the patients committed suicide, attracting nation concern – already bustling because of the whole environmental movement momentum – and encouraging the other victims to sue in spite of the social burden implied by so doing (Upham, 1976). The process in the court progressed among the other cases, public opinion concern and similar complaints in other cities. Initially filed by eleven plaintiffs, to 1995 the number of people alive compensated under the resolu-tion raised to 682 in this city. Yet remarkably, in accordance with our first statement about the generality of this problem, in the same designation date areas in Osaka and Kawasaki city were also included, mounting the number to 17199 victims, to a total of 75150 in the next ten years.